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CASES NOTED
THE FLORIDA VAGRANCY STATUTE: HERE TODAY,
GONE TOMORROW-HOPEFULLY
Petitioner was convicted of vagrancy under Florida Statute Section
856.02 for "wandering and strolling around from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object." Petitioner contended on appeal to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court that the statute proscribed no ascertainable standard of
criminal conduct and that it thus violated the due process clauses of both
the Florida Constitution and the United States Constitution. The Florida
Supreme Court, held, affirmed: the statute was not so vague as to be
constitutionally invalid. Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1970).
The Florida vagrancy statute, Florida Statutes Section 856.02, is
derived from a line of English vagrancy acts dating back to the four-
teenth century.' These acts were used to prevent those who had been
freed from the decaying feudal estates from wandering, and to keep them
in their own parish where they could be forced to work for wages.2
The English vagrancy acts, however, were not designed purely for
economic reasons. From the time of the Black Death until the middle of
the seventeenth century, the roads of England were crowded with the
unemployed. Some were honest laborers, but many were the "wild rogues"
of Elizabethan times who had been born to a life of idleness and who had
no intention of following any other life. Thus, vagrancy became prohibited
as a criminal activity, the penalties of which were extremely severe.?
Execution was the penalty for the third offense.4
The present Florida vagrancy statute was enacted in 1907.? In part,
it repeats legislation enacted by the English Parliament more than four
hundred years ago in the immediate aftermath of the Black Death. One
1. The first vagrancy statute was apparently the Statute of Laborers, 23 Edw. 3 (1349).
For a full history of vagrancy statutes, see 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND ch. 32 (1883).
2. See 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 274-75 (1883).
3. See Ledwith v. Roberts, [1937] 1 K.B. 232, a leading English decision on vagrancy.
4. An Act for the punishment of vagabonds and for the relief of poor and impotent
persons, 1 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1547).
5. Fla. Laws 1907, ch. 5720, § 1; FLA. STAT. § 856.02 (1969):
Vagrants-Rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling, or unlawful games or plays, common
pipers and fiddlers, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers,
traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling
places, common railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employ-
ment, or are without reasonably continuous employment or regular income and who
have not sufficient property to sustain them and misspend what they earn without
providing for themselves or the support of their families, persons wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual
loafers, idle and disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses or
tippling shops, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their
wives or minor children, and all able bodied male persons over the age of eighteen
years who are without means of support and remain in idleness, shall be deemed
vagrants, and upon conviction shall be subject to the penalty provided in § 856.03.
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authority has noted that the Florida statute seems distinctly Elizabethan.'
In the instant case, the appellant attacked Florida Statute Section
856.02 as being in violation of the due process requirement of certainty
in that it failed to proscribe any ascertainable criminal conduct. The
Florida Supreme Court in Brock v. Hardie7 held this standard to be:
a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessar-
ily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
the first essential of due process of law.'
In the recent case of State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan' the Florida
Supreme Court reaffirmed the standards set out in Brock by quoting at
length from that opinion. ° In addition, the court held that the due process
requirement of certainty was of special importance in criminal statutes
and that the courts were not at liberty to supply the needed elements to
make a vague statute meet the standards of certainty.
The instant case is not the first that has considered the Florida
vagrancy statute in relation to these due process requirements. In Headley
v. Selkowitz,"1 the Florida Supreme Court found Section 43-10.5 of the
City Code of the City of Miami (1957)12 "too vague to withstand con-
stitutional tests."' 3 However, in contrast to Section 43-10.5 of the Miami
Code, the Court mentioned the Florida vagrancy statute:
When compared and contrasted with our state statute (F.S. Sec-
tion 856.02, F.S.A.) defining vagrants, the excessive broadness
and vagueness of the Miami ordinance becomes readily ap-
parent. 14
The first and only direct challenge to the Florida vagrancy statute,
other than the instant case, was made in Johnson v. State."5 The petitioner
6. Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues, and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48
CALm'. L. REv. 557, 560 (1960).
7. 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).
8. Id. at 678, 154 So. at 694.
9. 191 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1966).
10. Id. at 34.
11. 171 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1965).
12. Section 43-10.
Disorderly conduct generally. Any person in this City shall be deemed guilty of
disorderly conduct who:
(5) Is found standing, loitering or strolling about in any place in the City and not
being able to give a satisfactory account of himself, or who is without any lawful
means of support.
13. Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1965). The tests to which the Court
explicitly referred were those previously propounded by the Second District Court of Appeal
in City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 114 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
[Tihe ordinance or statute must be sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts,
conduct or conditions required or forbidden, to prescribe the elements of the offense
with reasonable certainty, and make known to those to whom it applies what con-
duct on their part will render them liable for its penalties. Id. at 320.
14. Headley v. Selkowitz, 171 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1965).
15. 202 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1967).
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in Johnson challenged the statute as being violative of due process in that
it failed to proscribe any ascertainable standard of criminal conduct. The
Florida Supreme Court held in a per curiam decision that the trial court
was correct in finding the statute to be constitutional. No explanation was
given by the majority. Justice Ervin, concurring in part, found that the
statute met the tests of certainty which were outlined in State ex rel.
Lee v. Buchanan;'6 but, dissenting in part, he found this to be an un-
constitutional application of the statute in that there was no evidence that
the defendant was a habitual wanderer or stroller." Johnson was heard by
the United States Supreme Court, which declined to decide the constitu-
tional issues but reversed the decision upon the facts.'8
Throughout these decisions on the due process requirement of cer-
tainty, the Florida courts have attempted to track the language of the
United States Supreme Court.'9 Thus, it is not surprising that the holding
in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,° a recent United States Supreme Court case,
sounds substantially similar to the Florida decisions:
[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause
if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncer-
tain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors
free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is pro-
hibited and what is not in each particular case.21
On the basis of the language in previous cases, one might logically
conclude that the decisions of the federal courts and the Florida courts
on the validity of the same vagrancy statute would not be radically
different. The conclusion would, however, prove false. In Lazarus v. Fair-
cloth,22 a three judge federal court sitting in the Southern District of
Florida found Florida Statute Section 856.02 to be unconstitutional due to
its vagueness and overbreadth. 8 The federal court found that while there
might have been some valid segments of the statute, they were so in-
extricably intertwined with the invalid sections that separation was im-
possible.24
The instant case advanced basically the same arguments as those
advanced in Johnson. Once again, however, the Florida Supreme Court,
even in light of the Lazarus decision, upheld the statute. 25 In the majority
16. 191 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1966).
17. 202 So.2d at 855.
18. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968).
19. In Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934), the Florida Supreme
Court considered at length the United States Supreme Court case of Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927), while in City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, 114 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1959) the District Court quoted from United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
20. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
21. Id. at 402-03.
22. 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
23. Id. at 271.
24. Id. at 273.
25. Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 250, 251 (Fla. 1970).
1971].
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opinion, Justice Roberts cited part of the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice Ervin in the Johnson case:
[The statute] appears to be of the genre of vagrancy laws which
have long been upheld as necessary regulations to deter vaga-
bondage and prevent crimes and the imposition upon society
of able bodied irresponsibles who of their own volition become
burdens upon others and particularly on their families for sup-
port.2-0
The majority also held that the statute met the previously enunciated
tests for certainty. 7
Unlike the decision in Johnson, however, this decision was not
unanimous. Justice Boyd and Justice Drew dissented, finding that the
statute was "too vague to notify the public as to what standard of conduct
the State requires," 28 and that "[t]he burden must be upon the State to
prove one is doing an unlawful act. ' 29
Considering the holdings of Lazarus and the instant case, the decision
in Lazarus appears to state the better view. The vagrancy laws were drafted
to deal with problems of the fourteenth century which have long since
disappeared. To accomplish the purpose for which they were originally
drafted, these statutes were designed to be vague."' Vagrancy, and other
violations such as disorderly conduct, which are poorly defined and pro-
duce easily justifiable arrests, have long been used as a tool for police
harassment and as a means of validating unlawful arrests."' As Justice
Boyd noted in the instant case, vagrancy statutes are now "widely used
by police authorities to hold people remotely suspected of crime while
investigations were conducted.""
Contrary to the finding of the Florida Supreme Court that Florida
Statute Section 856.02 is "of the genre of vagrancy laws which have long
been upheld,""3 are numerous recent cases in which similar vagrancy
statutes have been declared invalid3 4 The Florida vagrancy statute seems
to fall into the class of statutes which have been declared impermissibly
vague. It also appears so overbroad as to include many innocent activities
within its scope."
26. Id. at 251.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1203 (1953).
31. See note 34 infra and Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention
of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950).
32. Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 250, 252 (Fla. 1970).
33. Id. at 251.
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (E.D.N.C. 1968); Landry v. Daley, 280
F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Fenster
v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426 (1967).
35. E.g., it could be argued a law student living on the earnings of his wife would be
engaging in criminal conduct under the language of Florida Statute § 856.02.
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At present, arrests are still being made under the Florida vagrancy
statute. However, both Lazarus and the instant case are being appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. Hopefully, that court will lay the
abuses of Florida Statute section 856.02 to rest.
HAROLD G. MELVILLE
HEPATITIS AND STRICT LIABILITY
Plaintiff, a patient in defendant hospital, received several transfusions
of whole blood as part of a course of treatment. She developed serum
hepatitus which required further hospitalization. Her suit against the
hospital, sounding in strict liability in tort, was dismissed by the Circuit
Court of Cook County. On appeal, the Illinois appellate court held that
the complaint stated a cause of action and remanded the cause for trial.'
A certificate of importance was granted by the appellate court and the
cause was heard by the Supreme Court of Illinois which held: affirmed:
The doctrine of strict liability based upon sale of a defective product in
an unreasonably dangerous condition is applicable to an eleemonsynary
hospital which transfuses blood to a patient as part of its general services.
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, - Ill. 2d -, 266 N.E.2d
897 (1970).
The majority of cases involving blood transfusions have been based
on the theory of breach of an implied warranty, under first, the UNIFORMt
SALES ACT and, more recently, the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. The
leading case is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.2 In that case, plaintiff
sought to recover on the theory that supplying blood was a sale within
the provisions of the SALES ACT and that, consequently, a warranty that
the blood was reasonably fit for the purpose intended was implied from
the sale. In a four-to-three decision, the New York Court denied recovery,
holding that the contract between the hospital and the patient was one
for services-not for the sale of goods-and was not divisible into sale
and service components. 8
The conclusion is evident that the furnishing of blood was only
an incidental and very secondary adjunct to the services per-
formed by the hospital and, therefore, was not within the pro-
visions of the Sales Act.4
The majority of the reported cases are in accord with the Perlmutter
decision.5 However, some courts have differentiated between a hospital
1. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733 (1969).
2. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
3. Id. at 104, 123 N.E.2d at 794.
4. Id. at 106, 123 N.E.2d at 795.
5. Accord, Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584
(1965); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1064);
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